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Prior studies on the relationship between ESG information and cost of debt have found 
mixed results. They conclude that this relationship may be affected by some characteristics 
or attributes of the company. In this study, we examine whether corporate reputation 
mediates the relationship between ESG information and cost of debt. In other words, this 
study explores how ESG information influences corporate reputation, and how, in turn, 
corporate reputation affects the cost of debt financing. Data for corporate reputation were 
obtained from the Fortune “World’s Most Admired Companies” List, whereas data on ESG 
information were extracted from two sources: ESG performance were obtained from 
Sustainalytics database and ESG disclosure were obtained from Bloomberg database. Data 
on cost of debt and other control variables were also collected from Bloomberg database. 
Using Structural Equation Models (SEM), we report a positive effect of both ESG 
performance and disclosure on corporate reputation. We also find that a good corporate 
reputation reduces the cost of debt financing and mediates the relationship between ESG 
performance/disclosure and cost of debt. We therefore conclude that firms that manage and 
disclose information on ESG issues have a better reputation, which in turn reduces their 
debt financing costs. 
Keywords Environmental, social, and governance (ESG), performance, disclosure, 
corporate reputation, cost of debt. 









Following corporate scandals at the beginning of the millennium (e.g., Enron, Worldcom) 
the importance of a good corporate reputation has never been greater (Smith et al., 2010; 
Veh et al., 2019). When a corporation faces suspicious behaviour or allegations of business 
misconduct and fraud, one of the most important intangible assets the company might have 
to lose is its reputation, which is fundamental to its business activities and to the firm’s 
stakeholders including customers, suppliers, investors, and lenders, among others 
(Hemphill, 2006; Gottschalk, 2011; Aguilera-Caracuel and Guerrero-Villegas, 2018). As a 
result, corporate reporting has been a subject of vigorous debate, and the views often 
diverge on how to enhance its quality and usefulness to investors, lenders, financial 
analysts, and other users (CICA, 2010; IFAC, 2012; OECD, 2013; CFA, 2018; CRD, 
2019). 
According to the Corporate Reporting Dialogue (CRD, 2019), the area that has commonly 
attracted the attention of several regulatory bodies is the integration of environmental, 
social, and governance (ESG)[i] factors into corporate reporting. Recent academic studies 
show that an increasing number of companies disclose ESG information (Eccles et al., 
2011; Odriozola and Baraibar-Diez, 2017; Amel-Zadeh and Serafeim, 2017; Yu et al., 
2018; Hamrouni et al., 2020) and that the management of ESG issues is high on the agenda 
of several CFOs in publicly listed corporations (Koehler and Hespenheide, 2013).  
According to the Governance & Accountability Institute (2019), 86 % of S&P 500 firms 
reported on their ESG and related issues in 2018, while the figure was less than 20 % in 
2011. The relevance of ESG reporting to investors, lenders, and other stakeholders, 
however, remains an unresolved question in the literature. A number of recent studies have 
examined the effects of ESG information on market value and cost of equity. Their results 
show that information on ESG factors increases the firm’s market value (Eccles et al., 
2011; Husser and Bardinet, 2014; Harjoto and Jo, 2015; Yu et al., 2018) and decreases its 
cost of equity (Dhaliwal et al., 2011; 2014; El Ghoul et al., 2011; Reverte, 2012; Wu et al., 
2014; Xu et al., 2015; Gupta, 2018). However, studies dealing with the effect of ESG 
information on cost of debt found mixed or inconclusive results.  
In this study, we argue that the relationship between ESG information and cost of debt[ii] is 
mediated by the corporate reputation. In doing so, we explore how ESG information 
influences corporate reputation, and how, in turn, corporate reputation affects the cost of 
debt financing. In addition, we examine whether corporate reputation mediates the 
relationship between ESG information and cost of debt. 
According to Smith et al. (2010), a positive corporate reputation is only possible with 
ethical behaviour regarding ESG issues. In this sense, companies that engage proactively 
in ethical initiatives over the long-term (e.g., environmental responsibility, good human 
resources practices, and honest financial reporting) are expected to build a better reputation 
and gain the trust of a greater number of stakeholders. On the other hand, extant evidence 
in the accounting and finance literature suggests that stakeholders like investors, lenders, 
financial analysts, corporate managers, and others routinely rely on corporate reputation 
for decision-making purposes (Milgrom and Roberts, 1982; Diamond, 1989; Hammond 
and Slocum, 1996). In this study, we examine a fundamental issue of whether a corporation 
that builds a positive reputation also experiences a lower cost of debt financing. If there is 
such benefit associated with corporate reputation, this would provide significant 
motivation to management to develop and maintain a corporate reputation-building 
strategy (Smith et al., 2010). 
To measure ESG information we rely on two reliable data sources: the Sustainalytics ESG 
performance and the Bloomberg ESG disclosure. Using a sample of U.S. S&P 500 firms 
included in the list of World’s Most Admired Companies from 2013 to 2016, we report a 
positive association between ESG information (performance and disclosure) and corporate 
reputation. We also find that a good corporate reputation reduces the cost of debt financing 
and mediates the relationship between ESG information (performance and disclosure) and 
cost of debt. We therefore conclude that firms that manage and disclose information on 
ESG issues have a better reputation, which in turn reduces their debt financing costs. We 
expect to make several contributions to the literature. First, the prior research on the 
relationship between ESG and cost of debt has suggested that this relationship may be 
affected by some characteristics or attributes of the company. In this study, we extend the 
existing literature by providing empirical evidence that the ESG-cost of debt relationship 
is mediated by corporate reputation. Second, this study adds to the growing literature on 
the determinants of corporate reputation by suggesting that corporate audiences construct 
the reputation of companies by interpreting information signals about the firms' ESG 
issues. Third, this study also contributes to the growing literature on the consequences of 
corporate reputation by demonstrating a significant benefit that derives from creating and 
maintaining a high reputation, namely the reduction in cost of debt.  
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section defines and describes the 
concepts of ESG and reputation and summarizes the results of prior empirical research on 
the topic. The third section presents our research objective and develops our research 
hypotheses. The methodology section describes the data sources, sample, and variable 
measures. The following section presents our main findings. Finally, the last section 
discusses the results and proposes practical implications for various stakeholders as well 
as directions for future research. 
Literature review  
Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) information 
The acronym “ESG” – for environmental, social, and corporate governance issues – was 
initially proposed by the United Nations Global Compact’s (UNGC) “Who Cares Wins” 
initiative in June 2004[iii] as a way to highlight the importance of these issues to investors, 
lenders, and other decision-makers (HKEx, 2011).  
According to Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEx, 2011), there are many 
terms to refer to corporate reports providing ESG information. One company may call it 
“corporate social responsibility (CSR) report”, “corporate responsibility report”, 
“corporate citizenship report” or “sustainability report”. Indeed, there is some confusion in 
the literature between the terms ESG, CSR, or sustainability. While few authors 
(Hillenbrand and Money, 2007; Hult, 2011) see a little difference, most agree that these 
terms are used interchangeably to describe the same concept: “treating the stakeholders of 
the firm ‘ethically’ or in a ‘responsible’ manner that is deemed acceptable in civilized 
societies” (Hopkins, 2003, page 10).  
For example, the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD, 1998, 
page 3) defines CSR as “The continuing commitment by business to contribute to economic 
development while improving the quality of life of the workforce and their families as well 
as of the community and society at large”. The European Commission (EC, 2011, page 6) 
also defines CSR as “The responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on society”. The 
Financial Times Lexicon[iv] describes ESG as “a generic term used in capital markets and 
used by investors to evaluate corporate behaviour and to determine the future financial 
performance of companies”. The Cambridge Business English Dictionary (2011, page 296) 
also defines ESG as “a way of judging a company by things other than its financial 
performance, for example its policies relating to the environment and how happy its 
employees are”. Based on these different definitions, we therefore use in this study ESG 
and CSR terms as synonyms. 
The three ESG terms (environmental, social, and governance) are often considered a catch-
all designation of corporations integrating sustainability within their overall corporate 
strategy, with the degree of such application varying by industry, country, and firm size 
(Schalteger, 2006; Shrivastava and Addas, 2014). Broadly speaking, environmental 
information refers to the footprint of the organization on the natural environment in which 
it operates (Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000; Limkriangkrai et al., 2016). This information may 
relate to corporate environmental policies on energy efficiency, greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions, hazardous waste, environmental litigation risk, environmental fines, and 
renewable energy where applicable (Shrivastava and Addas, 2014; Yu et al., 2018). Social 
information refers to equitable treatment of employees and protection of the social 
ecosystem in which the company operates (Limkriangkrai et al., 2016). It can include the 
percentage of employee turnover, employee training, percentage of workforce unionized, 
ratio of lowest wage to minimum wage, workforce satisfaction, and community 
engagement. Finally, corporate governance is the system by which business corporations 
are directed and controlled with ethics, integrity, and transparency (OECD, 2004; 
Limkriangkrai et al., 2016). Governance information includes board independence and 
diversity, compensation policies, takeover defences, anticorruption programs, and strength 
of internal audit and control mechanisms (Shrivastava and Addas, 2014; Yu et al., 2018). 
At the start of 2020, about $17 trillion of US-domiciled assets held by asset management 
firms and community investment institutions use ESG criteria in their investment analysis 
and portfolio selection. These assets represent more than 33 percent of all investment assets 
under professional management in the United States (Global Sustainable Investment 
Alliance, 2020). The increasingly use of ESG criteria in funding projects is also due to 
easier access to funds from banks and other lenders (Gupta, 2018). The use of ESG criteria 
becomes more and more important because investors, lenders, and other market 
participants now recognize that ESG represents opportunities and risks facing the firm 
(Limkriangkrai et al., 2016).     
Corporate reputation 
Until now, there is no commonly accepted definition of corporate reputation (See Veh et 
al., 2019). Fombrun (1996, page 72) contends that corporate reputation is “a perceptual 
representation of a company’s past actions and future prospects that describe the firm’s 
overall appeal to all its key stakeholders when compared to other leading rivals”. 
According to several theorists (Milgrom and Roberts, 1982; Deephouse, 2000), corporate 
reputation is not easy to define because it is based on various stakeholders’ views, 
intentions, and expectations of enterprise performance (Gottschalk, 2011). Indeed, it may 
vary from one stakeholder to the other depending on their perceptions and expectations, 
which are dynamic and likely to change over time. Appendix 1 presents nine attributes that 
Fortune uses to assess corporate reputation. 
The resource-based theory of the firm views corporate reputation as an intangible asset that 
is built up over time and that represents the value and trust that stakeholders have in the 
company (Fombrun and Shanley 1990; Deephouse, 2000; Warin and Teodoresco, 2012). 
This intangible asset is considered today by several economists and organisation theorists 
as the most important strategic asset to create value for the company and to achieve 
competitive advantage within an industry (Warin and Teodoresco, 2012; Pfister et al., 
2019). 
According to the signalling theory, the reputation of a firm acts as an important signal of 
the firm's organizational effectiveness (Landgraf and Riahi-Belkaoui, 2003; Riahi-
Belkaoui, 2004; Hsu, 2012). In this sense, a good reputation should enhance stakeholders’ 
support and loyalty, which helps in doing business and therefore brings economic benefits 
and competitive advantage to the firm (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004; Armitage and Marston, 
2008; Gottschalk, 2011; Pfister et al., 2019). These advantages may include : (1) customer 
preference in doing business with the company when other companies’ goods and services 
are available at a similar price and quality (Gottschalk, 2011); (2) the opportunity of 
charging premium prices for its products to consumers (Landgraf and Riahi-Belkaoui; 
Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004); (3) the capability to pay suppliers lower prices for purchases 
(Fombrun and Shanley 1990); (4) the creation of a better image in the capital markets and 
to investors through a more correct valuation (Landgraf and Riahi-Belkaoui; Riahi-
Belkaoui, 2004) and (5) the generation of more loyalty and productivity from employees 
(Fombrun and Shanley 1990).  
Prior research 
Prior research on the relationship between ESG (or CSR) and cost of debt is mostly based 
on the social contract theory. According to this theory, there is an implicit contract between 
firms and society, which specifies that business entities follow socially accepted and 
prescribed values and norms (Farache and Perks, 2010). The interaction between firm and 
society is constantly perceived as a critical element of corporate legitimacy. For example, 
constraining firms’ greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to an acceptable level (environmental 
factor), adopting equitable treatment of employees (social factor) or anticorruption 
programs (governance factor), etc. are acts of complying with social contract through 
which firms can achieve social legitimacy. In this setting, firms that are lax in 
decarbonizing the environment or fails to combat corruption or treat employees fairly, etc. 
are perceived by stakeholders (investors, lenders, etc.) to be acting in ways that are 
inconsistent with the values underlying the social contract (Deegan, 2002). Theoretically, 
this could have an effect on the firm's cost of debt financing. 
Drawing on social contract theory, the prior empirical studies on the relationship between 
ESG (or CSR) issues and cost of debt found mixed and inconclusive results. For example, 
Ye and Zhang (2011) show that the improvement of CSR reduces debt financing costs in 
China. In a similar study, Cooper and Uzun (2015) show that US firms with strong CSR 
have a lower cost of debt financing. Huang et al. (2018) also document a negative 
relationship between CSR and cost of bond in China. They conclude that CSR plays a 
significant role in reducing the risk premium of corporate bonds through an insurance-like 
effect. Moreover, Oikonomou et al. (2014) report that corporate social irresponsibility is 
penalized by US creditors through higher corporate bond yield spreads. Using a sample of 
3,996 loans to US companies, Goss and Roberts (2011) also provide evidence that 
companies with social responsibility concerns pay between 7 and 18 basis points more than 
companies that are more responsible. Ge and Liu (2015) also show that better CSR 
performance is associated with lower yield spreads and better credit ratings in the US. More 
recently, Hamrouni et al. (2020) find that ESG disclosure (used as CSR disclosure proxy) 
reduces the cost of debt for French companies.  
However, Menz (2010) and Hoepner et al. (2016) find non-conclusive evidence and no 
direct influence of CSR on debt financing costs using samples from different countries 
across the world. Other studies revealed a positive relation between CSR performance and 
cost of debt, demonstrating that CSR is not a value driver with an impact on the firm’s risk 
profile (e.g., Magnanelli and Izzo, 2017). Therefore, it seems that there is no unanimous 
consensus in the literature regarding the relationship between CSR and the cost of debt, 
and this link is still an empirical issue (Bacha et al., 2021). Debate and controversy continue 
thus to exist about how (i.e. mechanism) CSR influences corporate financial performance 
(Hasan et al., 2018) and therefore the cost of debt. These inconsistent findings imply that 
the effect of ESG (or CSR) on the cost of debt may rather be indirect through the other 
characteristics and attributes of the company. The previous results explain this controversy 
by the fact that “the strategic effects of CSR on the cost of debt depend on how financial 
stakeholders and creditors recognize the potentiality of CSR to reduce opacity risk, and 
perceive its benefits on firm value and reputation” (Bacha et al., 2021, page 138). Attig et 
al. (2013) also argue that the dangers of behaving socially irresponsible are realized 
through a decrease in firm’s intangible assets including reputation. This could affect the 
financial uncertainty, leading to a higher risk and thus higher cost of debt financing. Many 
other authors also suppose that CSR can increase reputation and decrease the firm risks 
(Desender et al., 2020; Bacha et al., 2021). It seems therefore that corporate reputation, 
among other factors, might explain the mechanism by which CSR influences cost of debt.  
In our study, we predict that the relationship between ESG (or CSR) issues and cost of debt 
is mediated by corporate reputation. This study can be one of the first to uncover the 
blackbox connecting CSR and cost of debt, which enhance therefore our understanding of 
the underlying mechanisms that legitimize CSR and create competitive advantage for the 
firm. Indeed, previous literature has shown that CSR has a positive effect on corporate 
reputation. For example, Vilanova et al. (2009) developed a model to explain how CSR 
activities affect financial performance and other dimensions of firm competitiveness. They 
suggest that CSR positively affects reputation which then improves performance[v]. In this 
setting, Brammer and Millington (2005) and Stuebs and Sun (2011) report that CSR is 
positively associated with corporate reputation using UK and US samples, respectively. 
Their results show that investment in socially responsible initiatives enhances corporate 
reputation. More recently, Odriozola and Baraibar-Diez (2017) confirm these results by 
showing that ESG disclosure increases the likelihood of having a higher corporate 
reputation in Spain. Using a national survey of US consumers, Kim (2019) also documents 
a positive effect of CSR disclosure on corporate reputation among consumers. Vercic and 
Coric (2018) find similar results based on the investigation of 550 senior college business 
students in Croatia. The results show that firms which develop different strategies, policies, 
and practices with regard to socially responsible behaviour have higher levels of perceived 
reputation among students. Finally, Axjonow et al. (2018) document similar results among 
professional stakeholders in the US. Their results show that CSR disclosure influences 
corporate reputation among this category of stakeholders.  
As to the relationship between corporate reputation and cost of debt, the research is very 
scarce, despite the fact that this relationship is intuitively appealing. To the best of our 
knowledge, Himme and Fisher (2014) is the only prior published[vi] study which has 
examined that relationship. Using Fortune magazine’s survey of corporate reputation, their 
results show that reputation exerts large impact on cost of debt financing in the US. Some 
other studies have examined the link between corporate reputation and firm valuation or 
cost of equity financing. Overall the results of these studies suggest that companies with 
better reputations enjoy a higher market value (Black and Carnes, 2000; Riahi-Belkaoui, 
2004; Smith et al., 2010) and a lower cost of equity financing (Cao et al., 2015; Pfister et 
al., 2019). 
Research objective and Hypotheses 
Overall, previous research dealing with the relation between ESG (or CSR) and the cost of 
debt are rather mixed or inconclusive. However, other research dealing with ESG 
information report a positive relation between ESG and corporate reputation. Finally, to 
the best of our knowledge, only one published research study (Himme and Fischer, 2014) 
has suggested that reputation lower cost of debt financing. 
We point out that the relationship between the three variables – ESG, reputation and cost 
of debt – has not been analyzed and this is what we propose to analyze in this research in 
order to test whether reputation plays a mediating role between ESG information and cost 
of debt. 
ESG information and corporate reputation 
While opponents of social responsibility argue that social responsibility expenditures are a 
poor use of shareholder money, proponents argue that social responsibility can improve the 
reputation of the firm (Linthicum et al., 2010). Indeed Porter and Kramer (2002) state that 
the fulfillment of economic and/or non-economic social responsibilities, such as making 
positive contributions to the betterment of society and the environment, can be a strategic 
device for corporate reputation building (Walsh et al., 2009; Park et al., 2014). 
In this sense, an increasing number of CEOs and senior managers rely on investments in 
social responsibility initiatives as a way to protect and build their firm’s reputation 
(Pharoah, 2003; MacLellan, 2019). For instance, Fortune considers social responsibility to 
the community and the environment to be one of the main attributes of corporate reputation 
(See Appendix 1). Social responsibility is viewed as a key driver of reputation by the 
corporation’s commitment to integrate economic, social, and environmental consideration 
into their quest for a competitive advantage (Warin and Teodoresco, 2012). Commitment 
to social responsibility is also based on the belief that companies should be responsible in 
their use of resources, whether natural, human, community, etc. (Larkin, 2003; Warin and 
Teodoresco, 2012). Socially-responsible firms expect to face fewer labour problems, fewer 
complaints from the community, and fewer environmental concerns from governmental 
agencies. These CSR firms may also have improved relationships with their stakeholders 
including investors, lenders, and government officials (Stuebs and Sun, 2011).  
In this setting, ESG information is valuable because it helps a company demonstrate that it 
is managing its risks and has a track record of paying attention to its ESG issues (Koehler 
and Hespenheide, 2013; Axajonow et al., 2018). Indeed, it can be argued that firms that 
constantly manage and make timely and informative disclosures are more likely to avoid 
withholding value-relevant unfavourable information (Landgraf and Riahi-Belkaoui, 
2003). Being recognized as a well-managed and high-quality reporting firm can enhance 
the organization’s reputation and foster greater trust with its stakeholders (IFAC, 2012).  
A high level of ESG performance and disclosure can therefore be perceived as a signal of 
firm or product quality, i.e., corporate reputation and brand equity (Hsu, 2012). Indeed, it 
is argued that ESG information is not primarily or exclusively designed for investors, but 
that it is rather aimed at satisfying the information needs of all corporate stakeholders 
(CICA, 2010; IFAC, 2012; Koehler and Hespenheide, 2013). Given that the reputation of 
the firm is shaped by stakeholders’ perceptions, we expect that ESG performance and 
disclosure will have an impact on corporate reputation (see Figure 1). In other words, if a 
firm does well in the design of its corporate governance system and the implementation of 
sound social and environmental responsibility practices, this will translate into good 
reputation (Lev et al., 2010; Odriozola and Baraibar-Diez, 2017). We conclude that the 
large majority of ESG factors are contributors to building and developing corporate 
reputation. We therefore formally state our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between ESG performance/disclosure and 
corporate reputation. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Corporate reputation and cost of debt 
The prior literature has, to a large extent, associated a company’s reputation with its debt 
payment history or its credit rating (e.g., Diamond 1989, 1991). The company’s payment 
track record or its credit rating is called “hard” information. However, Stein (2002) 
suggests that other “soft” information can also play a valuable role in screening loan 
applicants and determining borrowing costs. Soft information tends to involve qualitative 
(non-financial) information and may include a lender’s judgment about the quality of the 
firm’s managers and products, the innovativeness of the firm, and the talent of its 
workforce, i.e. the company reputation. In other words, corporate reputation may represent 
soft information not captured by financial statements, which is nonetheless valuable to 
lenders (Anginer et al., 2019). 
According to Larkin (2003), the investment in establishing a good reputation is similar to 
having an insurance coverage which can provide protection for well-regarded companies 
in times of intense pressure. Furthermore, Coombs and Holladay (2006) also consider that 
companies with a favourable reputation are deemed as similar to having a bank account 
containing reputation capital. Companies with good reputations are also perceived to enjoy 
the benefit of the doubt with stakeholders in the event of negative circumstances or bad 
news about the company (Warin and Teodoresco, 2012). According to Hammond and 
Slocum (1996), socially responsible firms may have lower perceived market risk because 
they are able to anticipate and ‘control’ their changing environment. 
As a consequence, we can expect that when a firm is viewed as socially responsible, it also 
may have a relatively low financial risk as a result of its more favourable relationship with 
the financial community. In contrast, less socially responsible firms may be considered to 
be riskier investments because of the possibility of government intervention (Hammond 
and Slocum, 1996). In this setting, it is suggested that reputation risk is considered as the 
most important risk facing companies by CEOs, directors, and publication relation 
professionals (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2005; EisnerAmper, 2011; Warin and 
Teodoresco, 2012). 
The financial impact of reputation loss can be significant, whether through a decline in 
revenue, a depletion of asset value, an increasing cost of capital, or eventually bankruptcy 
(Warin and Teodoresco, 2012). Inversely, a positive reputation can improve creditor trust 
and increase the company’s ability to obtain financing at consistently favourable rates 
(Armitage and Marston, 2008), therefore lowering financial costs (Stuebs and Sun, 2011). 
This leads to our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: There is a negative relationship between corporate reputation and cost of 
debt. 
Corporate reputation as a mediator of the ESG–cost of debt relationship 
In this article, it has been argued that the ESG performance/disclosure have an impact on 
corporate reputation. It has been further argued that corporate reputation has an impact on 
cost of debt financing. Accordingly, it is expected that corporate reputation mediates[vii] the 
relationship between ESG performance/disclosure and cost of debt. In other words, 
companies that manage and disclose information on ESG factors are expected to have 
better reputations, which in turn reduce their costs of debt financing. We state this 
prediction formally as our third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Corporate reputation mediates the relationship between ESG 




Data and sample selection 
Data for corporate reputation (mediator variable) were obtained from the Fortune “World’s 
Most Admired Companies” list, whereas data on ESG information (independent variable), 
were extracted from two sources: ESG performance were obtained from Sustainalytics 
database and ESG disclosure were obtained from Bloomberg database. Data on cost of debt 
(dependent variable) and other control variables were also collected from Bloomberg 
database. 
Our initial sample is based on all US S&P 500 firms included in the “World’s Most 
Admired Companies” rankings by Fortune from 2013 to 2016 (940 firm-year 
observations). From this initial sample, we eliminated firms which were missing some data 
on at least one of the databases (40 firm-year observations), which reduced our final sample 
to 900 firm-year observations (see Table 1). 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Table 2 presents the sample distribution by sector. This table shows that consumer 
discretionary, IT, industrials, financials, and health care sectors made up the largest 
proportion of firms in our sample (18.11%, 17.11%, 15.44%, 13.44%, and 12.22%, 
respectively). The consumer staples, utilities, real estate, energy, materials, and 
telecommunications services sectors made up the smallest proportions (7.22%, 5.78%, 
3.78%, 3.11%, 2.89%, and 0.89%, respectively). These figures are in accordance with 
previous studies which used Fortune’s rankings of “World’s Most Admired Companies” 
(e.g., Cao et al., 2015; Anginer et al., 2019), but also with the composition of the S&P 500 
index which is dominated by IT, Consumer discretionary, health care and financials 
sectors. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Variables measurements 
Dependent variable: Cost of debt 
To measure the cost of debt we used the Bloomberg calculation method. According to 
Bloomberg (2013, page18), the “weighted average cost of debt for the security is calculated 
using government bond rates, a debt adjustment factor, and the proportions of short and 
long term debt to total debt. The debt adjustment factor represents the average yield above 
government bonds for a given rating class. The lower the rating, the higher the adjustment 
factor. The debt adjustment factor (AF) is only used when a company does not have a fair 
market curve (FMC).  When a company does not have a credit rating, an assumed rate of 
1.38 (the equivalent rate of a BBB+ Standard & Poor’s long term currency issuer rating) is 
used”.   
Cost of debt = [[(Short term debt / Total debt) × (Pre-tax cost of short term debt × Debt 
adjustment factor)] + [(Long term debt / Total debt) × (Pre-tax cost of long term debt × 
Debt adjustment factor)]] × [1- Effective tax rate]. 
Independent variable: ESG information 
To measure ESG information we used two different data sources: Sustainalytics ESG 
performance score and Bloomberg ESG disclosure score. 
The Sustainalytics ESG performance score measures how well companies proactively 
manage the ESG issues that are the most material to their business. Performance against 
ESG issues is analysed by looking at a comprehensive set of core and sector-specific 
metrics, which are scored and weighted to determine a company’s overall ESG 
performance. The score ranges from 0 for “poor” ESG performance to 100 for “good” ESG 
performance[viii].  
The Bloomberg ESG disclosure score measures the amount of ESG data a company reports 
publicly. The score ranges from 0.1 for companies that disclose a minimum amount of ESG 
data to 100 for those that disclose every data point collected by Bloomberg. In other words, 
the higher the disclosure score, the more information is disclosed. Each data point is 
weighted in terms of importance, with data such as Greenhouse Gas Emissions carrying 
greater weight than other disclosures. The scores are also tailored to different industry 
sectors. In this way, each company is only evaluated in terms of the data that is relevant to 
its industry sector[ix]. According to many authors (Eccles et al., 2011; Shrivastava and 
Addas, 2014; Yu et al., 2018; Hamrouni et al., 2020; Lopez-de-Silanes et al., 2020), 
Sustainalytics and Bloomberg ESG data are arguably the most comprehensive data set on 
the sustainability measures offered by data providers.  
Mediator variable: Corporate reputation 
We measure corporate reputation using rankings in the “World’s Most Admired 
Companies” list, which is an annual list of company reputation rankings issued by Fortune. 
The “World’s Most Admired Companies” rankings are based on assessments from more 
than 4,000 senior executives, outside directors, and financial analysts of nine attributes of 
corporate reputation (see Appendix 1). These ratings were used to produce a list of the top-
ranked companies in each industry, for each criterion, and an overall rating of the 
company’s total reputation. The reputation score is the mean score averaging ratings 
ranging from zero (poor) to ten (excellent). Higher scores represent better reputation. The 
“World’s Most Admired Companies” list is by far the most widely-used measure of 
company reputation in academic research, presumably because it is an independent, 
publicly available[x] measure that covers a large number of companies and embodies the 
construct of “reputation” (Fombrun and Shanley 1990; Roberts and Dowling 2002; Smith 
et al., 2010; Veh et al., 2019). 
Control variables 
Like the previous studies we include in our empirical models the following control 
variables to control their effects on corporate reputation and cost of debt. 
- Firm sizeit measured by logarithm of total assets of firm i at the end of year t (Brammer 
et al., 2009; Brammer and Millington, 2005; Orens et al., 2010; Goss and Roberts, 
2011; Zhu, 2014).  
- Performanceit measured as net income scaled by total assets of firm i at the end of year 
t (Black and Carnes, 2000; Landgraf and Riahi-Belkaoui, 2003; Brammer et al., 2009; 
Brammer and Millington, 2005; Zhu, 2014).    
- Leverageit measured as total debt scaled by total equity of firm i at the end of year t 
(Brammer et al., 2009; Brammer and Millington, 2005; Orens et al., 2010; Goss and 
Roberts, 2011).  
- Growth salesit measured by the percentage increase or decrease of sales revenue of firm 
i by comparing current year t with same period prior year t (Black and Carnes, 2000; 
Brammer et al., 2009; Lorca et al., 2011). 
- Volatilityit measured by the standard deviation of the monthly stock returns of firm i in 
year t (Black and Carnes, 2000; Anderson et al., 2004; Brammer et al., 2009; Maaloul, 
2018).  
- Sector fixed effect. The GICS sectors are consumer discretionary, consumer staples, 
energy, financials, health care, industrials, IT, materials, real estate, 
telecommunications services, and utilities.  
- Year fixed effect. The years are 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016. 
All our measures of control variables were extracted from Bloomberg database.  
Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum, and 
maximum) of the study variables. The cost of debt ranges from 0% to 5.01% for the 
companies in our sample with a mean of 0.93%, which is in line with prior studies (e.g., 
Zhu, 2014; Maaloul, 2018). The mean of corporate reputation score is 6.32 out of 10 and 
ranges from 3.86 (lowest reputation score) to 8.8 (best reputation score), which is also in 
accordance with previous studies (e.g., Cao et al., 2015; Anginer et al., 2019). The mean 
of ESG performance score is 61.22 out of 100 and ranges from 38 (poorest ESG 
performance score) to 86.35 (best ESG performance score), which is also in line with prior 
studies (e.g., Lopez-de-Silanes et al., 2020; Eliwa et al., 2021). As for the ESG disclosure 
score, it ranges from 10.74 (minimum ESG disclosure score) to 74.79 (maximum ESG 
disclosure score) with a mean of 35.10 out of 100, which is also in accordance with 
previous studies (e.g., Yu et al., 2018; Hamrouni et al., 2020).  
Regarding the control variables, Table 3 shows that the mean value of firm size ranges 
from 7.307 (equivalent of 1.3 billion $US) to 14.761 (equivalent of 2,573 billion $US) with 
a mean of 10.338 (equivalent of 102 billion $US), which indicates that our sample is made 
up of companies of different sizes. The mean value of financial performance is 6.371 and 
ranges from -50.544 to 41.926, showing that our sample contains performing and 
nonperforming firms. The mean value of leverage, growth sales, and volatility are 1.762, 
4.319, and 21.27, respectively, which are comparable with prior studies (e.g., Goss and 
Roberts, 2011; Lorca et al., 2011; Maaloul, 2018). 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Univariate analyses 
Before performing the correlation and multivariate analyses to test our hypotheses, we 
performed, in a first step, univariate analyses. First, we grouped our sample into 3 groups 
according to the extent of ESG performance/disclosure (maximum, medium, and 
minimum), and then into 3 other groups according to the reputation score (excellent, 
medium, and poor). The results of one-way ANOVA are reported in Table 4 (Panel A for 
the relationship between ESG performance/disclosure and cost of debt, Panel B for the 
relationship between ESG performance/disclosure and corporate reputation, and Panel C 
for the relationship between corporate reputation and cost of debt). In accordance with 
expectations, the results show that there is no significant difference across ESG 
performance or disclosure groups (maximum, medium, and minimum) with respect to cost 
of debt (Panel A). In other words, there is no direct relationship between ESG performance 
or disclosure and cost of debt. However, the results show a significant difference at the 1 
percent level across ESG performance/disclosure groups (maximum, medium, and 
minimum) with respect to reputation (Panel B). In other words, companies that manage 
and disclose a maximum of ESG information have a better reputation than companies that 
manage and disclose a minimum of ESG information, which supports our Hypothesis 1 
(H1). Finally, the results in Panel C show a significant difference at the 1 percent level 
across corporate reputation groups (excellent, medium, and poor) with respect to cost of 
debt. In other words, companies with an excellent reputation benefit from a lower cost of 
debt than companies with a poor reputation, which supports our Hypothesis 2 (H2). In 
economic terms, the cost of debt for companies with a poor reputation is approximately 
42% higher than for companies with an excellent reputation. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Correlation analyses 
Table 5 reports the correlation matrices for variables used in this study. The Pearson 
correlation matrix is on the top, and the Spearman correlation matrix is on the bottom. Like 
previous studies (e.g., Lopez-de-Silanes et al., 2020; Eliwa et al., 2021), our results show 
that ESG performance score and ESG disclosure score are highly correlated (Pearson’s r = 
0.677, p<0.01 (Spearman’s Rho = 0.686, p<0.01)), which supports the validity of these 
two scores as good proxies for ESG information measurement. As expected, our results 
also show that there is no direct relationship between ESG performance or disclosure 
(independent variable) and cost of debt (dependent variable) (ESG performance: r = 0.009, 
n.s. (Rho = 0.039, n.s.); ESG disclosure: r = -0.013, n.s. (Rho = 0.029, n.s.)). However, the 
results show a positive and significant relationship between both ESG performance and 
disclosure (independent variable) and corporate reputation (mediator variable) (ESG 
performance: r = 0.184, p<0.01 (Rho = 0.186, p<0.01); ESG disclosure: r = 0.174, p<0.01 
(Rho = 0.174, p<0.01)) which supports our H1. The results also show a negative and 
significant relationship between corporate reputation (mediator variable) and cost of debt 
(dependent variable) (r = -0.113, p<0.01 (Rho = -0.082, p<0.05)) which also supports our 
H2. The support of H1 and H2 reinforces Hypothesis 3 (H3) according to which the 
relationship between ESG performance/disclosure and cost of debt may be indirect through 
corporate reputation (mediator variable); however, we cannot test it at this analysis stage. 
H3 will be tested in the following multivariate analyses. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Regarding the control variables, the results presented in Table 5 show that reputation is 
positively and significantly correlated with firm size (r = 0.206, p<0.01 (Rho = 0.206, 
p<0.01)) and financial performance (r = 0.267, p<0.01 (Rho = 0.250, p<0.01)), which is 
in line with prior studies (e.g., Landgraf and Riahi-Belkaoui, 2003; Brammer and 
Millington, 2005; Miller and Triana, 2009; Brammer et al., 2009). The results also show 
that reputation is negatively and significantly correlated with leverage (Rho = -0.159, 
p<0.01) and volatility (r = -0.153, p<0.01 (Rho = -0.101, p<0.01)), which is also in 
accordance with prior studies (e.g., Brammer and Millington, 2005; Brammer et al., 2009). 
However, the corporate reputation does not seem to be significantly correlated with a 
growth in sales. 
As for the control variables of cost of debt, the results show that it is positively and 
significantly correlated with leverage (Rho = 0.224, p<0.01) and volatility (r = 0.115, 
p<0.01 (Rho = 0.076, p<0.05)), which is in line with prior studies (e.g., Anderson et al., 
2004; Orens et al., 2010; Maaloul, 2018). The results also show that cost of debt is 
negatively and significantly correlated with financial performance (r = -0.075, p<0.05 (Rho 
= -0.099, p<0.01)), which is also in accordance with prior studies (e.g., Goss and Roberts, 
2011; Zhu, 2014; Maaloul, 2018). However, the cost of debt does not seem to be 
significantly correlated either with firm size or with a growth in sales. 
Finally, Table 5 shows that all correlations between explanatory variables are smaller than 
0.4, thus indicating that multicollinearity was not a serious threat in our multivariate 
analyses. In addition, multicollinearity diagnostics do not reveal any problems in the 
following multivariate analyses.  
Multivariate analyses 
The correlation analyses constitute an initial approach for testing our H1 and H2. We will 
now continue testing these hypotheses and H3 (mediation/indirect effect) using structural 
equations models (SEM) as multivariate analyses. The mediation/indirect effect is based 
on a bootstrap analysis (Preacher and Hayes, 2004) and performed on AMOS software in 
a first step. The bootstrap analysis outdated the limits of the approach of Baron and Kenny 
(1986), traditionally used in the analysis of mediation, and in particular the statistical power 
problem (Edwards and Lambert, 2007) and the diminution in type I error (Preacher and 
Hayes, 2008). The analyses are based on 5,000 replications generated by the bootstrap 
method with a 95% confidence interval. The results are reported in Table 6 (direct and 
indirect effects). In addition, we used in a second step the Hayes’ (2018) PROCESS macro 
for SPSS software, which is also based on a bootstrap analysis, as a robustness test. The 
results are presented in Table 7 (direct and indirect effects). 
Results based on AMOS 
Direct effects: The results presented in Panel A of Table 6 demonstrate that, after 
controlling for the effects of control variables, both ESG performance and ESG disclosure 
(independent variable) have a positive and significant effect on corporate reputation 
(mediator variable) (ESG performance: β = 0.140, p<0.01; ESG disclosure: β = 0.101, 
p<0.01). This result supports our H1 that an increase in ESG performance and disclosure 
would be positively associated with corporate reputation. In other words, an extensive 
information about ESG issues translates into better corporate reputation among 
stakeholders. It is worth to note that the effect of ESG performance on corporate reputation 
is more pronounced than that of ESG disclosure (β = 0.140 > β = 0.101). 
The results presented in Panel B of Table 6 also show that, after controlling for the effects 
of control variables, corporate reputation (mediator variable) has a negative and significant 
effect on cost of debt (dependent variable) (β = -0.145, p<0.01 when we use ESG 
performance or disclosure in the model). This finding also supports our H2 that corporate 
reputation would be negatively associated with cost of debt. In other words, firms with 
better reputation are perceived as less risky by lenders, which results in a lower cost of debt 
financing. It should be noted that, as expected, there is no significant direct relationship 
between ESG performance or disclosure (independent variable) and cost of debt 
(dependent variable) (ESG performance: β = 0.007, n.s.; ESG disclosure: β = 0.009, n.s.), 
which lead us to test the indirect (mediating) effect of corporate reputation in this 
relationship.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Indirect (mediation) effect: The results of bootstrap conducted on AMOS to examine the 
mediating effect of corporate reputation on the relationship between ESG 
performance/disclosure and cost of debt are presented in Panel C of Table 6. These results 
show that, after controlling for the effects of control variables, the indirect effect of ESG 
performance and disclosure (independent variable) on cost of debt (dependent variable) via 
corporate reputation (mediator variable) is significantly negative (ESG performance: β = -
0.020, p<0.01; ESG disclosure: β = -0.015, p<0.01). These findings support our H3 that 
corporate reputation would mediate the relationship between the ESG 
performance/disclosure and cost of debt. In other words, firms that manage and disclose 
information on ESG issues have a better reputation, which in turn reduces their debt 
financing costs. It is worth to note that the mediating effect of corporate reputation in the 
ESG-cost of debt relationship is more pronounced for ESG performance than for ESG 
disclosure (β = -0.020 > β = -0.015). 
Another indicator of the significance of the indirect effect is the upper and lower values. 
The Bias-Corrected Bootstrap method, which contains a correction for the bias created by 
the central tendency of the estimate (Fritz and MacKinnon, 2007), was used to verify the 
significance of mediation. An effect is considered statistically significant if zero was not 
included in the confidence interval (Fritz and MacKinnon, 2007). The results reported in 
Panel C of Table 6 indicate that the upper and lower interval do not contain zero (CI = [-
0.009, -0.007] for ESG performance and [-0.005, -0.003] for ESG disclosure), which 
supports the mediating effect and therefore H3: ESG performance/disclosure have an 
indirect effect on cost of debt through corporate reputation.  
Results based on the SPSS PROCESS macro 
Direct effects: The results presented in Panel A of Table 7 reveal that, after controlling for 
the effects of control variables, both ESG performance and ESG disclosure (independent 
variable) were positively and significantly related to corporate reputation (mediator 
variable) (ESG performance: β = 0.014, p<0.01; ESG disclosure: β = 0.006, p<0.01), 
supporting our H1. It is worth to note that the effect of ESG performance on corporate 
reputation is more pronounced than that of ESG disclosure (β = 0.014 > β = 0.006). 
The results in Panel B of Table 7 also indicate that corporate reputation (mediator variable) 
was negatively and significantly related to cost of debt (dependent variable) (β = -0.186, 
p<0.01 when we use ESG performance in the model; β = -0.185, p<0.01 when we use ESG 
disclosure in the model), providing support for H2. It should be noted that, as expected, 
there is no significant direct relationship between ESG performance or disclosure 
(independent variable) and cost of debt (dependent variable) (ESG performance: β = 0.001, 
n.s.; ESG disclosure: β = 0.001, n.s.), which lead us to test the indirect (mediating) effect 
of corporate reputation in this relationship.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Indirect (mediation) effect: The results of bootstrap conducted on the SPSS PROCESS 
macro (Hayes, 2018) to examine the mediating effect of corporate reputation on the 
relationship between ESG performance/disclosure and cost of debt are presented in Panel 
C of Table 7. These results show that, after controlling for the effects of control variables, 
the indirect effect of ESG performance and disclosure (independent variable) on cost of 
debt (dependent variable) via corporate reputation (mediator variable) is significantly 
negative (ESG performance: β = -0.013, p<0.01; ESG disclosure: β = -0.012, p<0.01). It is 
worth to note that the mediating effect of corporate reputation in the ESG-cost of debt 
relationship is slightly more pronounced for ESG performance than for ESG disclosure (β 
= -0.013 > β = -0.020). The results also indicate that the upper and lower interval do not 
contain zero (CI = [-0.001, -0.005] for ESG performance and [-0.002, -0.004] for ESG 
disclosure), supporting our H3: corporate reputation mediates the relationship between 
ESG performance/disclosure and cost of debt[xi]. 
 
Conclusion 
This study examines the mediating effect of corporate reputation on the link between ESG 
information and the cost of debt financing. Previous research has mainly focused on the 
direct association between sustainability reporting and cost of debt, and has reported mixed 
evidence (Menz, 2010; Goss and Roberts, 2011; Ye and Zhang, 2011; Oikomonou et al., 
2014; Ge and Liu, 2015). In this paper, we conjecture that ESG performance and disclosure 
have an indirect effect on cost of debt. ESG performance and disclosure enhance corporate 
reputation which translates into lower financing costs.  
To test for the mediating effect of corporate reputation, we used structural equation models 
(SEM) on a sample of US S&P 500 firms included in the “World’s Most Admired 
Companies” rankings by Fortune from 2013 to 2016. Consistent with our prediction, we 
find that both ESG performance and disclosure have a positive effect on corporate 
reputation. We also report that a good corporate reputation is negatively related to the cost 
of debt financing and plays the role of a mediator of the relationship between ESG 
performance/disclosure and cost of debt.  
We make several contributions to extant knowledge in management. First, we add to the 
existing literature on the relationship between ESG factors and cost of debt financing by 
showing that this relationship is mediated by corporate reputation. Second, we contribute 
to the literature on the drivers of corporate reputation by showing that a good management 
and transparent disclosure about material ESG issues enhances corporate reputation. Third, 
we also contribute to the existing literature on the consequences of corporate reputation by 
showing its beneficial effects on financing costs.  
Our research has several implications for managers, lenders, regulators, and accountants. 
First, our results could be helpful in making managers aware of the potential benefits of 
ESG management and disclosure. Not only can they obtain reputational gains, but they also 
can get better debt financing when they manage and disclose ESG information. In other 
words, firms should actively manage and disclose information about their ESG activities 
to the public in order to project their positive image to lenders and other stakeholders. 
Second, our results also suggest that lenders indirectly take into account ESG information 
through corporate reputation when assessing the creditworthiness of borrowers, and that 
corporate reputation is an important consideration in the pricing of corporate debt. Third, 
for regulators, the finding that the debt market values ESG information via corporate 
reputation provides further support for policies that encourage or enforce the commitment 
of firms to ESG. Finally, it is important for accountants and auditors to take into 
consideration the importance of ESG and reputation as strategic variables in the business 
model for the new economy for which new tools and procedures must be developed and 
implemented in order to optimize their management and their reporting as well as their 
audit and their control processes. 
Similar to prior research on this issue, our study is not without limitations. Our study 
focuses on a single country (US). Future research may extend our conclusions by exploring 
this issue in an international/multi-country setting. It would be interesting to examine 
whether the mediating effect of corporate reputation on the link between ESG information 
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Table 1: Sample selection process 
Sample 2013 2014 2015 2016 Firm-year 
observations 
Initial sample: US S&P 500 firms 
included in Fortune’s World’s Most 
Admired Companies rankings 
211 235 238 256 940 
Firms with missing some data on at 
least one of the databases 
 
(15) (12) (8) (5) (40) 
Final sample 
 
196 223 230 251 900 
 
Table 2: Sample distribution by sector 



































Total 900 100 
 
*GICS sector classification. 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum 
 
Cost of debt (%) 
 
0.93 1.125 0 5.01 
Reputation (Score) 
 
6.32 0.848 3.86 8.80 
ESG performance (Score) 
 
61.22 8.713 38.00 86.35 
ESG disclosure (Score) 
 
35.10 14.741 10.74 74.79 
Size (log) 
 
10.338 1.397 7.307 14.761 
Total assets (in millions of 
$US) 
 
102498 284718 1381 2573126 
Performance (%) 
 
6.371 6.374 -50.544 41.926 
Leverage (%) 
 
1.762 1.039 0 26.233 
Growth sales (%) 
 
4.319 16.590 -55.870 285.255 
Volatility (S.D.) 
 
21.270 9.127 6.460 109.058 









Table 4: A one-way between groups ANOVA 
 
Panel A: ESG information and cost of debt 
Variable Maximum 
ESG performance/disclosure 
n1 = 300 
Medium 
ESG performance/disclosure 
n2 = 300 
Minimum 
ESG performance/disclosure 
n3 = 300 
 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. F Sig. 




















Panel B: ESG information and corporate reputation 
Variable Maximum 
ESG performance/disclosure 
n1 = 300 
Medium 
ESG performance/disclosure 
n2 = 300 
Minimum 
ESG performance/disclosure 
n3 = 300 
 



























Panel C: Corporate reputation and cost of debt 
Variable Excellent 
Reputation 
n1 = 300 
Medium 
Reputation 
n2 = 300 
Poor 
Reputation 
n3 = 300 
 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. F Sig. 
Cost of debt 
 
0.78 0.99 0.89 1.11 1.11 1.24 6.743 
 
0.001*** 
Notes: N= 900 firms. Please see Appendix 2 for variables definitions. ***Significant at 1 per cent level. 
 
 
Table 5: Correlation matrices (Pearson’s r on the top, and Spearman’s Rho on the bottom) 
Variables 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Cost of debt (1) 
 
1 -0.113*** 0.009 -0.013 -0.052 -0.075** 0.050 -0.037 0.115*** 
Reputation (2) 
 
-0.082** 1 0.184*** 0.174*** 0.206*** 0.267*** 0.016 0.033 -0.153*** 
ESG performance 
(3) 
0.039 0.186*** 1 0.677*** 0.120*** 0.058* 0.029 -0.117*** 0.014 
ESG disclosure (4) 
 
0.029 0.174*** 0.686*** 1 0.377*** -0.024 0.039 -0.211*** -0.024 
Size (5) 
 
0.039 0.206*** 0.120*** 0.371*** 1 -0.294*** -0.017 -0.159*** -0.087*** 
Performance (6) 
 
-0.099*** 0.250*** 0.104*** -0.020 -0.387*** 1 0.007 0.169*** -0.211*** 
Leverage (7) 
 
0.224*** -0.159*** 0.071** 0.109*** 0.126*** -0.305*** 1 -0.010 0.005 
Growth sales (8) 
 
-0.050 0.047 -0.212*** -0.284*** -0.222*** 0.147*** -0.141*** 1 -0.013 
Volatility (9) 
 
0.076** -0.101*** -0.019 -0.037 -0.083** -0.123*** -0.011 0.001 1 




Table 6: Direct and indirect effects of ESG information on corporate reputation and cost of debt, performed on AMOS 
Variables Standardized direct effects Standardized indirect effect 
Panel A (H1) Panel B (H2) Panel C (H3) 
Corporate reputation Cost of debt Corporate reputation as a mediator 
Cost of debt as a dependent variable 
(1) (2) (1) (2) β Bias-Corrected 
Bootstrap 95% CI 
 
β t-value β t-value β t-value β t-value Lower Upper SE 
Size 
 
0.321*** 11.926 0.314*** 11.608 0.098*** 2.912 0.096*** 2.849     
Performance 
 
0.035 1.315 0.032 1.193 0.017 0.529 0.016 0.512     
Leverage 
 
0.001 0.026 0.001 0.011 0.044 1.395 0.044 1.394     
Growth 
sales 
0.110*** 4.085 0.109*** 4.008 -0.045 -1.420 -0.045 -1.407     
Volatility 
 
-0.223*** -8.274 -0.219*** -8.090 0.114*** 3.511 0.115*** 3.520     
Sector effect 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes     
Year effect 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes     
(1) ESG 
performance 
0.140*** 5.174   0.007 0.285   -0.020*** -0.007 -0.009 0.007 
(2) ESG 
disclosure 
  0.101*** 3.733   0.009 0.285 -0.015*** -0.003 -0.005 0.006 
Reputation 
 
    -0.145*** -3.729 -0.145*** -3.748     
Adj. R² 
 
0.350 0.340 0.112 0.111     
N 900 
Notes: Please see Appendix 2 for variables definitions. ***Significant at 1 per cent level. 
Table 7: Direct and indirect effects of ESG information on corporate reputation and cost of debt, performed on SPSS PROCESS macro  
Variables Standardized direct effects Standardized indirect effect 
Panel A (H1) Panel B (H2) Panel C (H3) 
Corporate reputation Cost of debt Corporate reputation as a mediator 
Cost of debt as a dependent variable 
(1) (2) (1) (2) β Bootstrap 95% CI 
 
 
β t-value β t-value β t-value β t-value Lower Upper SE 
Size 
 
0.208*** 8.640 0.204*** 7.898 0.076* 2.390 0.074* 1.871     
Performance 
 
0.001 1.190 0.001 1.075 0.001 0.440 0.001 0.430     
Leverage 
 
0.001 0.026 0.001 0.031 0.001 1.140 0.001 1.144     
Growth 
sales 
0.006*** 3.750 0.006*** 3.770 -0.003 -1.450 -0.003 -1.451     
Volatility 
 
-0.022*** -7.390 -0.022*** -7.247 0.011** 2.380 0.011** 2.389     
Sector effect 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes     
Year effect 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes     
(1) ESG 
performance 
0.014*** 4.707   0.001 0.250   -0.013*** -0.005 -0.001 0.001 
(2) ESG 
disclosure 
  0.006*** 3.118   0.001 0.276 -0.012*** -0.004 -0.002 0.005 
Reputation 
 
    -0.186*** -3.720 -0.185*** -3.735     
Adj. R² 
 
0.260 0.247 0.071 0.071     
N 900 
Notes: Please see Appendix 2 for variables definitions. ***,**,*Significant at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level, respectively. 
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APPENDIX 1: Fortune’s World’s Most Admired Companies 
 Attributes of corporate reputation: 
 
1. Ability to attract and retain talented people 
 
2. Quality of management 
 




5. Quality of products or services 
 
6. Wise use of corporate assets 
 
7. Financial soundness 
 
8. Long-term investment value 
 

















APPENDIX 2: Variable definitions 
Cost of debtit The cost of debt for firm i in year t is measured as following: 
Cost of debt = [[(Short term debt / Total debt) × (Pre-tax cost 
of short term debt × Debt adjustment factor)] + [(Long term 
debt / Total debt) × (Pre-tax cost of long term debt × Debt 
adjustment factor)]] × [1- Effective tax rate]. 
 
ESG information:  
ESG performanceit The Sustainalytics ESG performance score for firm i in year t 
ranges from 0 (poor) to 100 (good). 
 
ESG disclosureit The Bloomberg ESG disclosure score for firm i in year t 
ranges from 0.1 (minimum) to 100 (maximum). 
 
Reputationit The corporate reputation score for firm i in year t ranges from 
0 (poor) to 10 (excellent). 
 
Sizeit Size measured by logarithm of total assets of firm i at the end 
of year t.  
 
Performanceit Performance measured as net income scaled by total assets of 
firm i at the end of year t. 
 
Leverageit Leverage measured as total debt scaled by total equity of firm i 
at the end of year t. 
 
Growth salesit Growth sales measured by the percentage increase or decrease 
of sales revenue of firm i by comparing current year t with 
same period prior year t. 
 
Volatilityit Volatility measured by the standard deviation of the monthly 
stock returns of firm i in year t. 
 
Sector Sector fixed effect. The GICS sectors are consumer 
discretionary, consumer staples, energy, financials, health 
care, industrials, IT, materials, real estate, telecommunications 
services, and utilities. 
 




























i In this paper, we use ESG as a generic term subsuming all different sustainability terminologies, such as 
“corporate social responsibility (CSR)”, “corporate responsibility”, “corporate citizenship”, “sustainability”, 
etc. 
ii According to the Financial Times Lexicon, “the cost of debt is the effective rate that a firm pays on its 
current loans, bonds and various other forms of debt. The measure provides an idea as to the overall rate 
being paid by the firm to use debt financing”. A higher cost of debt implies that the firm has poor credit and 
higher risk, whereas a lower cost of debt means that the firm has good credit and less risk (Maaloul, 2018). 
iii http://www.unglobalcompact.org.uk/issues/financial-markets/ (accessed the 22nd November 2020). 
iv http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=ESG (accessed the 22nd November 2020). 
v Corporate reputation is considered as a key mediator in the relationship between a firm’s CSR and financial 
performance. 
vi In an unpublished study, Anginer et al. (2019) have also examined the relationship between corporate 
reputation and cost of debt. Their results show that reputation plays an important role in determining 
corporate cost of debt in the US. 
vii In this study, we expect that corporate reputation acts as mediator variable and not as moderator variable 
in the relationship between ESG performance/disclosure and cost of debt. In another words, we expect that 
ESG performance/disclosure have an indirect effect on cost of debt through reputation (mediator variable) 
(see Figure 1). In a mediating relationship, as in our model, the independent variable (ESG performance or 
disclosure) is an antecedent of the mediator variable (reputation) and the latter is an antecedent of the 
dependant variable (cost of debt). The mediator variable (reputation) therefore has the status of dependent or 
independent variable depending on the angle from which it is observed. A moderator variable, on the other 
hand, systematically remains an independent variable regardless of the angle of analysis, which is not the 
case in this study since our results confirm our first hypothesis according to which both ESG performance 
and disclosure have a positive and significant effect on corporate reputation (see results).  
viii Sustainalytics’ ESG rating research methodology: Company ESG research (2017): https://wrds-
www.wharton.upenn.edu/documents/303/Sustainalytics_ESG_Ratings_Methodology_Quick_Overview_20
17.pdf (accessed the 22nd September 2021). 
ix Bloomberg Professional Services: https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/solution/bloomberg-terminal/ 
(accessed the 22nd September 2021). 
x The Fortune World’s Most Admired Companies List was publicly available “free of charge” until 2016, the 
last year of our sample. From 2017, this list is included in paid databases.  
xi In robustness tests, we calculated the industry-adjusted cost of debt and re-estimated all our equations, 
replacing the cost of debt by the industry-adjusted cost of debt. The industry-adjusted cost of debt is the 
difference between the cost of debt of a firm in a given year and the median cost of debt of its industry in that 
year. The results are quite similar to those based on cost of debt (untabulated results). 
 
                                                          
